[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":25},["ShallowReactive",2],{"zoom:p5ch17z12:en":3},{"period":4,"chapter":15,"zoom":18},{"id":5,"title":6,"titleEn":6,"titleEs":7,"coverArtworkId":8,"range":9,"rangeEn":9,"rangeEs":9,"cover":10},"p5","High Middle Ages","Plena Edad Media","hannibal-alpes","987 → 1453",{"fileName":11,"filePageUrl":12,"imageUrl":13,"sourceLabel":14},"Facade-notre-dame-paris-ciel-bleu.JPG","https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Facade-notre-dame-paris-ciel-bleu.JPG","/assets/p5-moyen-age-classique-cover.png","Wikimedia Commons",{"id":16,"title":17},"p5ch17","Charles V the Wise: Reconquest, State, and the Western Schism (1364–1380)",{"id":19,"title":20,"chapterId":16,"html":21,"hasEn":22,"isFallback":23,"seoDescription":24},"p5ch17z12","1364-1365: Charles the Bad, the Treaty of Avignon, and the Evreux-Montpellier Exchange","\u003Cp>After Cocherel, the Navarrese crisis did not vanish immediately. Charles V needed to convert battlefield success into durable political settlement.\u003C/p>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>🗺️ Diplomacy as a Weapon\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>In 1364, Charles II of Navarre still pursued alliances and territorial bargaining that threatened Valois authority in both northern and southern theaters.\u003C/p>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>✍️ March 1365: The Treaty of Avignon\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>Under the \u003Cstrong>Treaty of Avignon\u003C/strong> (March 1365), Charles the Bad accepted abandoning strategic Lower Seine positions, especially around \u003Cstrong>Evreux\u003C/strong>, in exchange for \u003Cstrong>Montpellier\u003C/strong>.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>The logic was geographic and political: remove a dangerous prince from fortresses near Paris and coronation routes.\u003C/p>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>⚙️ Why the Evreux-Montpellier Exchange Mattered\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>For Charles V, the exchange was not merely territorial:\u003C/p>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Evreux\u003C/strong> gave direct leverage near Normandy and the capital;\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Montpellier\u003C/strong> shifted Navarrese influence farther south;\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>the risk of rapid coalition with English support and mercenary captains was reduced.\u003C/li>\n\u003C/ul>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>📌 Medium-Term Effects\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>The Navarrese threat persisted, but with weaker Norman leverage.\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>The crown gained time to reorganize finance and military structures.\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>Charles V confirmed a pragmatic approach: avoid unnecessary battle when political repositioning could reduce risk.\u003C/li>\n\u003C/ul>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>🧠 To Remember\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>After Cocherel, Charles V pursued diplomatic neutralization of Navarre.\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>The treaty’s core objective was strategic displacement, not symbolic compromise.\u003C/li>\n\u003C/ul>\n",true,false,"After Cocherel, the Navarrese crisis did not vanish immediately. Charles V needed to convert battlefield success into durable political settlement.",1778543135916]