[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":32},["ShallowReactive",2],{"zoom:p7ch3z4:en":3},{"period":4,"chapter":22,"zoom":25},{"id":5,"title":6,"titleEn":6,"titleEs":7,"range":8,"rangeEn":8,"rangeEs":8,"covers":9},"p7","Renaissance","Renacimiento","1461 → 1610",[10,13,16,19],{"filename":11,"url":12},"British_-_Field_of_the_Cloth_of_Gold_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg","https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:FilePath/British_-_Field_of_the_Cloth_of_Gold_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg?width=1600",{"filename":14,"url":15},"Marignan-1515-francois1er.jpg","https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:FilePath/Marignan-1515-francois1er.jpg?width=1600",{"filename":17,"url":18},"ChateauDeChambord.jpg","https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:FilePath/ChateauDeChambord.jpg?width=1600",{"filename":20,"url":21},"Henri_IV_Toschi_(format_original).jpg","https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:FilePath/Henri_IV_Toschi_(format_original).jpg?width=1600",{"id":23,"title":24},"p7ch3","Louis XII: [title to be completed later in the chapter] (1498–1515)",{"id":26,"title":27,"chapterId":23,"html":28,"hasEn":29,"isFallback":30,"seoDescription":31},"p7ch3z4","1501–1504: Conquest of the Kingdom of Naples","\u003Cp>After the clean success at Milan, one might have expected Louis XII to be on an unstoppable roll. Naples would prove otherwise: what began as a shrewd partition between two crowns ended, three years later, in complete military disaster.\u003C/p>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>🤝 The Franco-Aragonese Alliance\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>It all started with an agreement signed on 11 November 1500: the \u003Cstrong>Treaty of Granada\u003C/strong>, between Louis XII and \u003Cstrong>Ferdinand of Aragon\u003C/strong>. The idea was simple, almost cynical — share out the kingdom of Naples rather than fight over it. France would take Naples, the Terra di Lavoro and the Abruzzi; Aragon would get Apulia and Calabria. Venice and the pope, for their part, would stay neutral.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>Each side had something to gain. Louis XII wanted to complete his Italian domination, already well under way with Milan. Ferdinand pursued a more personal goal: eliminating the Neapolitan branch of his own Aragonese family. And King Frederick I of Naples, weakened, made an easy target for both ambitions combined.\u003C/p>\n\u003Ch2>⚔️ The Conquest (1501)\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>On the ground, it moved fast. Thirty thousand Frenchmen under \u003Cstrong>d’Aubigny\u003C/strong>, twenty thousand Aragonese under \u003Cstrong>Gonzalo de Córdoba\u003C/strong>: faced with this two-pronged offensive, Frederick I capitulated without even giving battle. Naples fell as early as July 1501.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>What remained was to split the spoils. The French zone covered the north of the kingdom — Naples, Capua; the Aragonese zone, the south — Apulia, Calabria. The line of demarcation followed the river Liri. On paper, it looked clean. On the ground, it was far less so: the border stayed vague, and tensions were not long in coming.\u003C/p>\n\u003Ch2>⚔️ The Franco-Aragonese Conflict (1502–1503)\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>You could see it coming from the start: a poorly defined buffer zone, ambitious commanders on both sides, a mutual distrust that never really faded. Add to that the broader European balance of power weighing in the background, and the alliance was hanging by a thread.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>That thread snapped in July 1502, with the first border incidents. In August, the alliance was officially broken. In September, hostilities began in earnest.\u003C/p>\n\u003Ch2>⚔️ The Decisive Battles\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>At \u003Cstrong>Seminara\u003C/strong>, on 21 April 1503, d’Aubigny’s Frenchmen won a victory — a minor one, but enough to stabilise the front for a while. A week later, at \u003Cstrong>Cerignola\u003C/strong>, on 28 April, everything turned: facing Gonzalo de Córdoba, the Duke of \u003Cstrong>Nemours\u003C/strong> suffered a decisive defeat. This battle is often remembered as the first ever won thanks to firearms — a tactical turning point that cost France Apulia.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>The finishing blow came at the \u003Cstrong>Garigliano\u003C/strong>, on 29 December 1503. Fifteen thousand Frenchmen commanded by \u003Cstrong>Louis II de Saluces\u003C/strong> faced twenty thousand Aragonese under Gonzalo de Córdoba. The defeat was catastrophic — and with it, all of southern Italy now slipped from France’s grasp.\u003C/p>\n\u003Ch2>🏃 The French Retreat\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>What followed was one long withdrawal. Naples was abandoned in January 1504. The retreat north was organised in February. Troops returned to France in March. The toll: ten thousand dead, prisoners taken, equipment lost — a heavy bleeding for the French army.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>Two treaties formally sealed this failure. The \u003Cstrong>Treaty of Blois\u003C/strong>, signed on 22 September 1504, provided for the marriage of \u003Cstrong>Claude de France\u003C/strong>, born in 1499, to \u003Cstrong>Charles of Habsburg\u003C/strong> (the future Charles V), born in 1500 — and that of his niece \u003Cstrong>Germaine de Foix\u003C/strong> to Ferdinand II of Aragon, to whom Louis XII ceded his rights over Naples. This treaty would not survive long: the Estates-General of Tours in 1506 would obtain its annulment and impose instead the marriage of Claude to \u003Cstrong>Francis of Angoulême\u003C/strong>, the future Francis I.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>The \u003Cstrong>Treaty of Lyon\u003C/strong>, signed on 31 January 1504, settled the rest: France gave up all claims to Naples, Ferdinand recognised in return France’s possession of Milan, prisoners were exchanged, and a three-year peace was agreed.\u003C/p>\n\u003Ch2>📊 Analysing the Failure\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>Militarily, everything worked against France: an opponent, Gonzalo de Córdoba, who proved a formidable tactician; difficult supply lines over distant terrain; a punishing climate, between disease and heat; and French commanders who, it must be said, did not always coordinate their efforts.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>Politically, the picture was no more flattering: a fragile alliance from the outset, a local population rather sympathetic to the Aragonese, total diplomatic isolation in southern Italy, and a king whose attention remained fixed on the north, on Milan, more than on Naples. All of which helps explain why a conquest so promising in 1501 ended in fiasco just three years later.\u003C/p>\n\u003Ch2>🧠 Key Takeaways\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>1500\u003C/strong>: Treaty of Granada (partition of Naples)\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>1501\u003C/strong>: joint Franco-Aragonese conquest\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>1502\u003C/strong>: breakdown of the alliance\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>1503\u003C/strong>: battles of Cerignola and the Garigliano (French defeats)\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>1504\u003C/strong>: Treaty of Blois (marriage of Claude to Charles of Habsburg) and Treaty of Lyon (abandonment of Naples)\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Consequences\u003C/strong>: end of French ambitions in southern Italy\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Outcome\u003C/strong>: a costly failure, a loss of prestige\u003C/li>\n\u003C/ul>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Next zoom\u003C/strong>: The Estates-General of Tours and the title of “Father of the People.”\u003C/p>\n",true,false,"After the clean success at Milan, one might have expected Louis XII to be on an unstoppable roll. Naples would prove otherwise: what began as a shrewd",1784451810241]