Henry IV, King of France and Navarre: the pacification of the kingdom and the Edict of Nantes (1589-1610) · RENAISSANCE
Beyond the direct rivalry with Spain already recounted in the body of the chapter, Henry IV’s diplomacy wove, throughout his reign, a network of alliances intended to contain the power of the Habsburgs, masters of both Madrid and Vienna. This policy of balance culminated in a famous project, though never formally drafted by the king himself: the “Grand Design” for a pacified and rebalanced Europe.
With England, the alliance forged during the Wars of Religion — Elizabeth I had provided decisive subsidies and reinforcements at the siege of Arques — continued without a break under James I, Henry IV’s cousin who ascended the throne in 1603: the two sovereigns shared a common strategic interest in containing Spain and supporting the revolt of the United Provinces, to the point of considering the marriage of Princess Henrietta Maria to the future Charles I of England. With the United Provinces themselves, at war with Spain since 1568, Henry IV maintained close personal relations with the stathouder Maurice of Nassau, founded on reciprocal military and financial support against the common enemy.
This network extended as far as the Protestant principalities of Germany, federated in 1608 within the Evangelical Union, which France supported diplomatically and financially against the Catholic League backed by the Habsburgs, and as far as the Ottoman Empire, with which France renewed, through its ambassador in Constantinople François Savary de Brèves, a traditional alliance inherited from Francis I — a pragmatism that did not go without drawing criticism from the devout Catholics of the court. To the south, relations with Savoy remained marked by the mistrust inherited from the war of 1600-1601, while those with the Republic of Venice and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, drawn closer by the marriage to Marie de Médicis, remained cordial.
Described in detail in the Économies royales that Sully published after the king’s death, the “Grand Design” remains a project whose exact proportion of dream and genuinely envisaged political programme continues to divide historians. As Sully presents it, it aimed to reorganise Europe into some fifteen states of comparable size, endowed with borders redrawn according to criteria more rational than dynastic inheritance, and federated within common institutions — a general assembly, an executive council, a court of justice — responsible for guaranteeing peace and defusing conflicts through negotiation rather than war.
Whether it was, in the king’s own mind, a genuine roadmap or rather a geopolitical intuition given shape after the fact by his minister, this project in any case illustrates the vision Henry IV held of the European balance: to contain Habsburg hegemony not by force alone, but through a lasting reorganisation of relations between powers. His death, in 1610, interrupted any beginning of implementation, and the context of generalised war that was to open eight years later with the Thirty Years’ War made this design retrospectively all the more utopian — without preventing it from being seen, much later, as a premonitory intuition of European unification projects.
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