Louis XIV and the Height of Absolutism (1643-1715) · ANCIEN REGIME
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, controller-general of finances from 1665 until his death in 1683, developed from his entry into Louis XIV’s service in 1661 a coherent economic policy known as Colbertism — a form of French-style mercantilism according to which a kingdom’s wealth was measured by its stock of gold and silver, to be increased by favouring exports and limiting imports through systematic state intervention. The son of Reims cloth merchants, trained in Mazarin’s service before being recommended by him to Louis XIV, Colbert worked fifteen to sixteen hours a day and soon combined the offices of superintendent of Buildings, secretary of state for the Navy and for the King’s Household — an economic power concentrated with no equal in the kingdom.
At the heart of the Colbertist system stood the royal manufactories, privileged enterprises benefiting from monopolies, subsidies and tax exemptions in exchange for strictly regulated production quality. Alongside the Gobelins (1662), devoted to luxury tapestry and furniture, and Saint-Gobain (1665), a glassworks intended to rival the Venetian monopoly, were added hundreds of textile or armaments establishments — Van Robais at Abbeville for fine wool cloth, Indret for cannon — subject to regulations of extreme precision: standardised cloth widths, prescribed dyeing recipes, compulsory marking of compliant pieces. This rigour gave the “French product” a reputation for quality that facilitated exports, at the cost, however, of innovation hampered by excessive control.
This industrial policy was accompanied by an avowed customs protectionism, of which the 1667 tariff was the main instrument: by imposing high duties on Dutch and English goods, it aimed to protect the kingdom’s fledgling industry, at the risk of a genuine trade war with the United Provinces that contributed, a few years later, to the outbreak of the Franco-Dutch War. Colbert also tried to unify the internal market by reducing the multiplicity of internal tolls — the “Cinq Grosses Fermes” of the kingdom’s northern region formed its core — and had major infrastructure works undertaken, foremost among them the Canal du Midi (1666-1681), linking the Atlantic to the Mediterranean under the direction of the engineer Pierre-Paul Riquet.
Colbert made naval power a priority objective: starting from a mere twenty or so ships in 1661, the royal navy numbered about a hundred and twenty by 1677, supported by newly built or enlarged arsenals at Brest, Toulon and Rochefort, while the 1668 maritime registration organised for the first time a systematic census of seafarers. This fleet was meant to support a still modest but expanding colonial empire: New France, populated by barely 3,000 settlers in 1663 despite the organised sending of the “King’s Daughters,” the French Antilles — Saint-Domingue, Martinique, Guadeloupe — devoted to sugar cultivation, and the Indian trading posts of Pondicherry (1674) and then Chandernagor, where French companies struggled to compete with their far better capitalised Dutch and English rivals.
This colonial sugar economy rested on the slave trade, organised by the Compagnie du Sénégal and transporting one to two thousand African slaves per year to the Antilles. It was within this framework that Colbert had the Code noir drawn up, promulgated in 1685 after his death: this text, which defined the hereditary status of slavery in the French colonies while regulating certain aspects of the treatment of slaves and imposing their Catholic baptism, legally institutionalised French colonial slavery for more than a century and a half.
On taking office, Colbert found a kingdom crushed by a debt estimated at about 400 million livres, inherited from the wars of Louis XIII and the Fronde, against annual revenues limited to 80 million. An inquiry conducted between 1661 and 1664 revealed the extent of the financiers’ fraud, and the Chambre de Justice created for the occasion — whose trial of Fouquet remains the most notorious episode — made it possible to reduce the recognised debt by about half, brought down to some 200 million livres by 1683, while revenues rose in parallel to 110 million. This improvement remained fragile, however: Colbert himself gauged that the costly wars waged by Louis XIV were methodically cancelling out his efforts at fiscal consolidation, a conflict rather aptly summed up by Marshal Vauban, a constant critic of a taxation system “so poorly distributed that it crushes some while leaving others almost unburdened” — the nobility and clergy remaining largely exempt from the taille, the principal direct tax.
Voltaire later acknowledged, in his Siècle de Louis XIV, that “Colbert made trade respectable in France,” a judgment that fairly sums up the nuanced balance sheet of Colbertism: a real modernisation of the kingdom’s economy and administrative apparatus, but a work ultimately undermined by the king’s military priorities and by the structural limits of a still largely rural and unequal economy.