[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":22},["ShallowReactive",2],{"zoom:p6ch3z12-1364-1365-charles-the-bad-the-treaty-of-avignon-and-the-evreux-montpellier-exchange:es":3},{"period":4,"chapter":12,"zoom":15},{"id":5,"title":6,"titleEn":7,"titleEs":6,"range":8,"rangeEn":8,"rangeEs":8,"covers":9},"p6","La Guerra de los Cien Años","The Hundred Years' War","1328 → 1461",[10],{"filename":11,"url":11},"COMTE_Pierre-Charles_Sacre_de_Charles_VII_Huile_sur_toile.jpg",{"id":13,"title":14},"p6ch3","Carlos V el Sabio: reconquista, Estado y Cisma de Occidente (1364–1380)",{"id":16,"title":17,"chapterId":13,"html":18,"hasEn":19,"isFallback":20,"seoDescription":21},"p6ch3z12","1364-1365: Charles the Bad, the Treaty of Avignon, and the Evreux-Montpellier Exchange","\u003Cp>After Cocherel, the Navarrese crisis did not vanish immediately. Charles V needed to convert battlefield success into durable political settlement.\u003C/p>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>🗺️ Diplomacy as a Weapon\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>In 1364, Charles II of Navarre still pursued alliances and territorial bargaining that threatened Valois authority in both northern and southern theaters.\u003C/p>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>✍️ March 1365: The Treaty of Avignon\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>Under the \u003Cstrong>Treaty of Avignon\u003C/strong> (March 1365), Charles the Bad accepted abandoning strategic Lower Seine positions, especially around \u003Cstrong>Evreux\u003C/strong>, in exchange for \u003Cstrong>Montpellier\u003C/strong>.\u003C/p>\n\u003Cp>The logic was geographic and political: remove a dangerous prince from fortresses near Paris and coronation routes.\u003C/p>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>⚙️ Why the Evreux-Montpellier Exchange Mattered\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cp>For Charles V, the exchange was not merely territorial:\u003C/p>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Evreux\u003C/strong> gave direct leverage near Normandy and the capital;\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>\u003Cstrong>Montpellier\u003C/strong> shifted Navarrese influence farther south;\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>the risk of rapid coalition with English support and mercenary captains was reduced.\u003C/li>\n\u003C/ul>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>📌 Medium-Term Effects\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>The Navarrese threat persisted, but with weaker Norman leverage.\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>The crown gained time to reorganize finance and military structures.\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>Charles V confirmed a pragmatic approach: avoid unnecessary battle when political repositioning could reduce risk.\u003C/li>\n\u003C/ul>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Ch2>🧠 To Remember\u003C/h2>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>After Cocherel, Charles V pursued diplomatic neutralization of Navarre.\u003C/li>\n\u003Cli>The treaty’s core objective was strategic displacement, not symbolic compromise.\u003C/li>\n\u003C/ul>\n",true,false,"After Cocherel, the Navarrese crisis did not vanish immediately. Charles V needed to convert battlefield success into durable political settlement.",1782343352376]