John II the Good: Captivity, Internal Crisis, and the Treaty of Brétigny (1350–1364) · HIGH MIDDLE AGES
In 1354, the Navarrese crisis mixes with large Franco-English diplomacy. The prospect of a global peace may seem desirable, but it is explosive: it redraws sovereignty and can trigger internal coalitions.
An agreement is signed at Guînes on April 6, 1354. It envisages vast territorial concessions, with a prolonged truce. Even if the agreement must be confirmed elsewhere, it shows one thing: France is so weakened that extreme solutions become discussable.
At Avignon, while negotiations continue, Charles II of Navarre seeks to prevent a peace that would close his options. He works to stay in the game, influence discussions, and preserve the possibility of alliances that serve his territorial ambitions.
In the shadow, pacts and promises can go so far as to envisage a dismemberment of the kingdom, according to a logic of sharing spheres of influence: English crown, but redistribution of provinces and rights to internal allies.
This prospect reinforces instability: as the end of truces approaches, everyone calculates their support, their ports, and their supply routes, as if the resumption of war must be accompanied by a crisis of sovereignty.